The literature suggests that extreme weather experiences have potential to increase climate change engagement by influencing the way people perceive the proximity and implications of climate change.
Introduction
One of the main ways climate change is perceived is through changes in extremes that lie beyond the bounds of previous weather (Trenberth, 2012) . Indeed, people often infer the evidence for climate change from perceived weather anomalies (Borick and Rabe, 2014; Egan and Mullin, 2012; Howe and Leiserowitz, 2013) , and multiple studies have linked extreme weather experiences with the perceived risk of dangerous climate change and willingness to act pro-environmentally (Haden et al., 2012; Spence et al., 2011; van der Linden, 2014a) . These observations have commonly been invoked to support a view that extreme weather experiences have potential to foster climate change engagement 1 by influencing the way people perceive the reality, immediacy and implications of climate change (McDonald et al., 2015) .
Research in psychology suggests that exposure to extreme weather can inform climate change perceptions through experiential processing; whereby negative affective responses to impacts from adverse weather are intuitively associated with climate change and salient memories of experiencing such impacts contribute to heightening perceived risk from climate change (Marx et al., 2007; Weber, 2006) . People typically rely on experiential processing in judging risks because deliberative analytical processing of statistical risk information requires more cognitive effort and occurs less automatically (Myers et al., 2013; Weber, 2006) . Although there is mixed evidence about people's ability to accurately detect changes in local climatic trends (Brody et al., 2008; Hamilton and Keim, 2009; Howe and Leiserowitz, 2013; Marlon et al., 2018) , extreme weather events may operate as climate change 'signals' that heighten risk perception by increasing the salience of climate change, triggering concern and making future climatic events more imaginable (Demski et al., 2017; Renn, 2011 ).
Yet, as many people understandably see extreme weather and climate change as separate issues, extreme weather experiences do not invariably affect climate change perceptions (Brulle et al., 2012; Whitmarsh, 2008) . In the event of an encounter with extreme weather or perceived anomalous weather changes, there are a number of available narratives with which individuals may choose to make sense of their experience, including natural climatic variability, anthropogenic climate change and other exceptional incident possibilities (Reser et al., 2014) . Unless the experience is explicitly deemed to be a manifestation of climate change, it is unlikely to significantly influence climate change perceptions (McCright et al., 2014; Reser et al., 2014) . Logically, extreme weather must be perceived to be connected with climate change to have any relevance in informing climate change perceptions. While exposure to extreme weather may spontaneously update the perceived risk of subsequent adverse weather impacts (Frondel et al., 2017; Siegrist and Gutscher, 2006) , more deliberate experience appraisal is required for extreme weather experiences to be interpreted in terms of climate change risk (Hamilton-Webb et al., 2017) . In other words, extreme weather does not inherently signify climate change. Rather, a conscious subjective attribution of extreme weather to climate change operates as a necessary condition for extreme weather experiences to be marshalled into the constitution of climate change risk perceptions (van der Linden, 2014b ).
To date, there has been limited investigation of the implications of individual differences in extreme weather attribution for the link between extreme weather experiences and climate change attitudes.
Subjective attribution is typically subsumed under supposed measures of personal climate change experience (e.g., asking survey participants if they have personally experienced any "extreme weather conditions that they interpret as caused by long-term global climate change" [Blennow et al., 2012] ) or implied in speculative interpretations of the link between extreme weather experiences and climate change attitudes (e.g., Demski et al., 2017) . A few recent studies have tackled a proximate question regarding differences in the influence of objective and perceived weather patterns on climate change perceptions (Marlon et al., 2018; Shao, 2016; Shao and Goidel, 2016) . However, the extent to which the subjective attribution of specific weather events to climate change plays a role in modulating the way experience of the events affect individual responses to climate change remains unclarified.
This article investigates the interaction between personal experience and subjective attribution of flooding in predicting climate change attitudes. 'Subjective attribution' is conceptualised here as a personal understanding that an extreme weather event is causally connected to climate change or is a sign of climate change. Using data from a national survey conducted following major flooding across the United Kingdom in winter 2013/2014, the analyses explore how subjective attribution moderates the relationship between flooding experience, perceived threat from climate change and climate change mitigation responses. The role of psychological and social factors, specifically climate change belief, political affiliation and perceived normative cues, as influences on subjective attribution is also examined.
Flooding experience and public responses to climate change in the UK
Large parts of the UK suffered exceptionally severe flooding in the winter of 2013 (UK Met Office, 2014 . Heavy rains combined with strong winds caused significant disruption to individuals, businesses and infrastructure. These events necessitated a national emergency response, and prompted then Prime Minister, David Cameron, to voice "suspicion" that the severe weather was linked to global climate change (BBC, 2014) . Flooding is expected to be one of the main impacts on UK communities resulting from climate change (DoH, 2001) , and climate scientists have since confirmed that anthropogenic warming significantly contributed to the 2013/2014 UK flooding (Schaller et al., 2016) .
Shortly after the floods, researchers from two British universities conducted a national survey of climate change perceptions Pidgeon et al., 2016) . They found that people who directly experienced the flooding were more likely to perceive their local area to be vulnerable to climate change impacts and view climate change as a threat to themselves and their family .
Additionally, most participants in the survey responded affirmatively to questions about the likelihood that the flooding may have been caused in part by climate change (64%), and that the floods demonstrated what can be expected from climate change in the future (72%). Interestingly, a greater proportion of participants indicated agreement (45%) than disagreement (33%) with a statement that:
'it is impossible to link a single weather event with climate change'; reflecting a level of ambivalence in the perceived attributability of the flooding to climate change. Further analysis of data from the survey revealed that climate change concern, negative emotional responses to flooding, and the personal salience of climate change, significantly mediated an indirect link between personal experience of the floods and intentions to engage in mitigation behaviour, as well as support for national climate policies (Demski et al., 2017) .
However, evidence of a link between flooding experiences and climate change engagement in the UK had been mixed prior to the 2013/2014 flooding. In one national study, self-reported local flooding experience was shown to have an indirect positive link with preparedness to reduce energy use, and this link was mediated by perceived instrumentality (efficacy), concern and perceived local vulnerability to climate change . Conversely, a study conducted in southern England showed that flood victims reported no greater levels of concern or engagement in actions aimed at addressing climate change than non-flood victims (Whitmarsh, 2008) . A more recent study also showed that, while there was a statistically significant link between flooding experience and climate change mitigation behaviours among a sample of UK farmers, these behaviours were not motivated by intentions to address climate change per se (Hamilton-Webb et al., 2016) . There was a consensus across the latter two studies that personal values might play a stronger role than experience in determining individuals' responses to flooding and climate change.
The role of subjective attribution in Spence et al.'s (2011) findings is unclear, as participants in their study were not asked if they perceived their reported flooding experiences to be attributable to climate change. However, Whitmarsh (2008) and Hamilton-Webb et al. (2016) reported that climate change was the least frequently cited cause of flooding, compared with other factors such as poor watercourse maintenance, among participants in their studies. Given indications that extreme weather experiences are unlikely to instigate climate change mitigation action and policy support in the absence of a perceived connection with climate change (McCright et al., 2014; Reser et al., 2014) , it is reasonable to consider the likelihood that individual differences in the subjective attribution of flooding to climate change may help explain the inconsistencies in the evidence for a link between flooding experience and climate change attitudes in the UK.
Conceptual framework and hypotheses
Human societies have historically sought to establish causes for their daily weather, and establishing culpability for adversity or personal affliction is often the first step towards overcoming or living with its effects (Hulme, 2014) . One of the most common questions put to climate scientists in the aftermath of extreme meteorological events is: 'Was this weather event caused by climate change?' (Hulme, 2014; Stott and Walton, 2013) . This line of questioning reflects public interest in determining if specific extreme weather events are consistent with patterns expected from climate change. Against a backdrop of increasing belief in anthropogenic climate change among the public (Harvey, 2015; Milfont et al., 2017) , it also reflects an interest in determining if the incidence of extreme weather is linked to the environmental impact of human activities. On these accounts, the attribution of weather extremes to climate change encapsulates the concretisation of climate change risk, and a validation of the moral and practical onus to act, in public consciousness.
Irrespective of objective physical events or scientific evidence, experiences of environmental conditions are subjectively interpreted (Demuth et al., 2016) and subjective weather interpretations are likely to be shaped by individuals' social and political context (Marlon et al., 2018) . In this respect, perceptions of extreme weather events may be influenced by the reactions of institutional actors, such as politicians and the media (Cologna et al., 2017) , as well as the reactions of other individuals with whom the perceiver has a personal connection. These reactions can exert a normative influence by signalling what opinions are common or desirable in society (Tankard and Paluck, 2016) . Extreme weather experiences may also be interpreted through the lens of personal values, beliefs and political loyalties (Borick and Rabe, 2017; Capstick and Pidgeon, 2014; Cutler, 2015; Goebbert et al., 2012; Kahan, 2013) . Values and beliefs typically bias experience appraisal in favour of personal intuitions and preferences (Bruine de Bruin et al., 2014; Capstick and Pidgeon, 2014; Howe and Leiserowitz, 2013) , and political affiliation may embody norms that prescribe prototypical in-group attitudes and responses to key issues (Fielding and Hornsey, 2016) .
For example, research in the UK indicates that the interpretation of cold weather as evidence for or against climate change is determined by individuals' level of scepticism about climate change, and climate change scepticism is in turn related to personal preferences for egalitarian versus individualist modes of social relations (Capstick and Pidgeon, 2014) . According to the cultural theory of risk, egalitarians view nature as fragile and ephemeral, whereas, individualists perceive nature to be resilient (Steg and Sievers, 2000; Thompson, 2003) . For this reason, egalitarians may see climate change as a danger requiring an active response and interpret unusually cold weather as confirming evidence of climate change risk, while individualists may see climate change as unproblematic and interpret unusually cold weather as evidence against climate change (Capstick and Pidgeon, 2014) . Greater levels of climate change scepticism have also been linked with right-leaning political affiliation Whitmarsh, 2011) . This plausibly explains why extreme weather experience (specifically flooding experience) has been shown to be a weaker predictor of willingness to engage in climate change mitigation behaviour among right-leaning UK voters compared with their left-leaning counterparts (Ogunbode et al., 2017) .
When people perceive themselves in terms of their ideological or political group membership, they assimilate to the group prototype and their attitudes and behaviours become regulated by the norms and standards associated with their group identity (Hogg and Reid, 2006; Rabinovich et al., 2012) . Through this process, ideology and political affiliation can exert a powerful influence on how individuals perceive environmental conditions. In the United States, individuals with liberal values or left-leaning political affiliation show a greater tendency to report unusual changes in their local weather Shao, 2016) , and to perceive negative impacts from extreme weather (Cutler, 2015) , than those with conservative values or right-leaning political affiliation. Further, perceived unusual weather changes and reported personal impacts from extreme weather are significantly associated with belief that climate change is happening now; a belief which is more commonly held by liberals than conservatives in the US (Bohr, 2017; Cutler, 2015; Howe and Leiserowitz, 2013; Shao, 2016) . Accounting for differences in climate change belief tends to weaken statistical estimates of the relationship between political orientation and weather perception (Shao, 2016; Shao and Goidel, 2016) , which suggests that the influence of political orientation on extreme weather perceptions may be mediated by climate change belief. The polarising influence of political/ideological group membership on weather perceptions and climate change attitudes may be further moderated by other social factors.
US research shows that education contributes positively to divergence in climate change belief and the perceived likelihood of a future rise in extreme weather events among individuals with different ideological orientations , whereas, exposure to severe weather impacts are broadly associated with climate change threat perception among individuals at the lower end of the socioeconomic spectrum regardless of their ideological views (Cutler, 2016) .
Two main points were distilled from these theoretical and empirical considerations to form the basis for the hypotheses tested in this study. Firstly, given a view of extreme weather attribution as encapsulating reflections on climate change risk and human responsibility, the attributability of extreme weather events to climate change may constitute a potential trigger for action by confirming the reality of the risks posed to society by climate change and affirming the agency of human action in precipitating and averting these risks. In other words, people may more strongly perceive a threat from climate change and feel a greater impulsion to act when they interpret their experiences with extreme weather to be attributable to climate change. Secondly, the subjective attribution of extreme weather experiences to climate change is likely to be influenced by individuals' personal and social context, especially their belief in climate change, political affiliation and perceived normative cues from salient actors. This means that: (1) pre-existing climate change belief may foster an implicit motivation to attribute extreme weather experiences in a manner that confirms personal intuitions and understanding, (2) the politicization of the public discourse around climate change may cause individuals to conform their subjective attribution of extreme weather events with political in-group views, and (3) the reactions of politicians, the media and other salient actors in individuals' immediate environment may influence subjective attribution of extreme weather by providing cues regarding popular and normative interpretations of an extreme weather event.
Thus, the following hypotheses were tested with respect to personal experience of the 2013/2014 UK winter flooding:  (H1) Extreme weather experience has a stronger direct association with perceived threat from climate change among individuals who attribute their extreme weather experience to climate change, compared with those who do not.
 (H2) Through its moderating influence on the association between extreme weather experience and perceived threat, subjective attribution also moderates the indirect link between extreme weather experience and climate change-related behavioural intentions/policy support that is mediated by perceived threat. In other words, extreme weather experience is expected to inspire a greater level of motivation to act and to support climate change policies via its influence on perceived threat among people who attribute their experience to climate change compared with those who do not.
 (H3) Belief that climate change is happening is positively associated with subjective attribution of extreme weather experience to climate change.
 (H4) Affiliation with right-leaning political groups is negatively associated with subjective attribution of extreme weather experience to climate change.
 (H5) The reactions of institutional and socially-proximate actors e.g., politicians (H5a), the media (H5b), and acquaintances (H5c) regarding the attributability of extreme weather events to climate change is significantly linked with individuals' subjective attribution of their personal experience.
Method

Data
Data from a project entitled: 'Public perceptions of climate change and personal experience of flooding' (Pidgeon et al., 2016) were used to test the hypotheses. 
Data analysis
Personal experience of the 2013/2014 UK flooding was broadly operationalised in this study to reflect direct experience of damage to own property, disruption of movement and access to essential services, damage to other property in local area, as well as experience of flood damage by friends and family.
The decision to employ such a broad view of flooding experience was based on a consideration that the spatial coverage of flooding often means that affected individuals are exposed to direct, indirect, individual and collective adverse impacts (cf. Capstick et al., 2015; Demski et al., 2017) . Further, the current operationalisation encompasses the range of flooding experience measures previously employed in the UK, including experience of flood damage to property (Demski et al., 2017; Whitmarsh, 2008) , experience of flooding in local area , and combined experience of flood damage to property and experience of flooding in local area (Hamilton-Webb et al., 2016) ; which enables justifiable comparisons of findings from the current study with those from previous research.
Measures of flooding experience, attribution, perceived threat from climate change, climate change mitigation intentions, climate change policy support, climate change belief and perceived reactions of salient actors were derived from the dataset (Table 1) Using stated voting intentions in a hypothetical general election, individuals who indicated an intention to vote for the 'British National Party (BNP)', 'UK Independent Party (UKIP)', or 'Conservatives' were categorised as right-leaning voters. The placement of these parties on the political spectrum was based on data from public polls conducted by YouGov in which people were asked to place each political party and themselves on a left-right scale ranging from "very left-wing" (-100) to "very right-wing" (+100) (Dahlgreen, 2014) . Right-leaning voters were the focus in the current analyses (with the reference category being 'other' voters) because they may be more likely to conform with the norms of their political in-group (Panagopoulos and van der Linden, 2016) . This focus also derives from a desire to further explore reasons why flooding experiences may have a weaker link with climate change mitigation responses among right-leaning UK voters (see Ogunbode et al., 2017) .
Hypothesized direct relationships and interactions among constructs were tested in AMOS 22.
Significant interactions were plotted with the web-based interActive tool (McCabe et al., 2018) and hypothesized moderated mediation effects were tested with the PROCESS macro for regression-based estimation of mediation, moderation and conditional processes (Hayes, 2014) . Demographic factors (age, gender, social grade) were included as covariates all hypothesis tests and non-parametric bootstrapping with 1,000 resamples was employed to ensure robustness of the estimates obtained.
'Don't Know' and 'Refused' responses in the dataset were coded as missing data. Three variables in the analyses had a relatively high proportion of missing data: perception of flooding to have been linked to climate change by politicians (13.1%), the media (9.3%) and acquaintances (7.1%), while others only had a small proportion of missing data (<5%). The regression imputation function in AMOS 22 was used to impute the missing data. Descriptive statistics and reliability indices for the measured constructs are presented in Table 1 . Zero-order intercorrelations among the constructs are provided as Supplementary Data (T2). Note: Multi-item variables are represented in the analyses by the mean of their constituent items. Principal axis factor analysis with oblimin rotation was used to verify that each multi-item variable reflects a single underlying factor (see Supplementary Data T3). (Table 2) . However, as expected (H2), perceived threat did not significantly mediate an indirect link between flooding experience and either mitigation intentions or climate policy support at low levels of subjective attribution. The results of the moderated mediation analysis supports the notion that people are more likely to view climate change as a threat, and exhibit support for mitigation, following experiences with extreme weather events that are perceived to be attributable to climate change. (Preacher and Hayes, 2008) . The index of moderated mediation represents the slope of the line relating an indirect effect to values of a moderator (Hayes, 2015) .
Results
Tests of hypotheses
Discussion
It has been suggested that extreme weather events may provide an avenue for engaging the public with the growing risks posed by climate change (Demski et al., 2017; Wallace, 2012) The link between flooding experience and climate change perceptions is often explained as a function of experiential processing (e.g., Demski et al., 2017; Taylor et al., 2014) . In this regard, experiential processing is thought to reflect reliance on 'judgment heuristics', specifically: the availability heuristic -whereby flooding experiences presumably heighten perceived threat from climate change by increasing the ease with which salient weather changes come to mind, and the affect heuristic -whereby negative affective responses to flooding are intuitively associated with climate change. However, this explanation is limited by a neglect to account for differences in individuals' conscious rationalisation of their flooding experiences as indications of climate change risk. Given that climate change refers to long-term shifts in planetary weather patterns, any single extreme weather experience provides limited intuitive information about broader climatic trends (Egan and Mullin, 2012) . Thus, individuals are likely to draw on the prescriptions of their values, beliefs and social preferences, and on normative cues (e.g., the perceptions and attitudes of key social referents), in determining appropriate interpretations of extreme weather with respect to climate change (Carmichael and Brulle, 2017; Kahan, 2013) Unveiling nuances in the link between extreme weather experiences and climate change calls for greater emphasis of the psychological, political and social contexts in which extreme weather is subjectively interpreted with respect to climate change. Douglas (1985) indicated that the attribution of responsibility is shaped by the same biases that shape the social construction of risk. In a similar vein, the subjective attribution of extreme weather events to climate change is likely to be influenced by the same biases that shape broader perceptions of the reality and risk of climate change. Although personal experience of the 2013/2014 UK flooding positively predicted subjective attribution of the flooding to climate change, subjective attribution was more strongly predicted by climate change belief, and climate change belief had no significant association with flooding experience. Given a personal psychological context of pre-existing belief that climate change is occurring, it stands to reason that individuals may be inclined to confirm their preconceptions by rationalising unusual weather as evidence of climate change risk. In support of this view, the current study echoes previous indications that people often interpret their personal experiences with weather in the direction of their prior beliefs (Marlon et al., 2018; Myers et al., 2013) .
This study also reiterates evidence of a link between political affiliation and climate change perceptions insofar that right-leaning voting intention was shown to negatively predict attribution of the 2013/2014 UK flooding to climate change. This finding is consistent with previous suggestions by Ogunbode et al. (2017) that flooding perceptions and associated responses to climate change in the UK covary systematically with individuals' political affiliation. Affiliation with the right-leaning Conservative Party has previously been linked with climate change scepticism (Whitmarsh, 2011) , and political group identity can be expected to influence whether individuals perceive relevant events to be unusual, unnatural and a reason to worry or act (Hahnel and Brosch, 2016; Shao and Goidel, 2016) . Therefore, it seems plausible that right-leaning UK voters may be predisposed to reject a rationalisation of flooding as manifestation of climate change in conformity with the normative views that prevail within their political groups.
However, while modest correlations have been found between political ideology and climate change perceptions in the UK (McCright, Dunlap, & Marquart-Pyatt, 2016 : online supplement), it is important to consider that climate change scepticism among right-leaning UK voters may not necessarily be rooted in personal endorsement of a right-wing ideological orientation, but may also lie with the affinity between possessing climate change-sceptic views and supporting the position(s) taken by right-leaning political parties on other key issues. For example, a perceived shift to the 'liberal consensus' on immigration and UK membership in the European Union by the Labour Party (categorised here as leftleaning) drove many of its supporters to defect to right-leaning parties with hard-line positions on these issues (Evans and Mellon, 2016) . Defection in this instance was more evidently determined by the parties' policies than a large-scale change in voters' ideological orientation. This implies that voters across the ideological spectrum may be attracted to right-leaning parties' stances on specific issues and that these stances potentially coincide with climate change scepticism and de-emphasis of climate change risk. In this respect, shared views on key issues including climate change may form a broad basis for identification with right-leaning political parties or right-leaning parties' views on climate change may become a standard that shapes the climate change attitudes of members who are attracted by the parties' stance on other issues. There is a need for further research, however, to determine the extent to which ideological orientation can be disentangled from party affiliation in predicting climate change attitudes in the UK.
Another important result obtained in this study pertains to the pattern in which subjective attribution was predicted by belief that politicians, the media or acquaintances linked the floods to climate change.
Previous research in the US indicates that political cues and media coverage play a positive role in driving public concern about climate change (Carmichael and Brulle, 2017) [Female, [65] [66] [67] [68] [69] [70] [71] [72] [73] [74] Dawlish] . These comments reflect the widely publicised public mistrust of UK politicians' reactions to the floods (Cologna et al., 2017) , and suggest that the negative relationship observed between political cues and subjective attribution may be the result of perceived politicians' lack of credibility in the context of the flooding. Similarly, in contrast to indications by Cologna et al. (2017) that media reporting plays an active role in shaping public responses to flood risks, the perception that media reports linked the 2013/2014 flooding to climate change did not positively predict individuals' subjective attribution of the event. However, belief that acquaintances perceived the flooding to have been caused by climate change was a positive predictor of subjective attribution. People often look to others for guidance on appropriate responses to situations that are perceived to be uncertain or ambiguous and the likelihood of conforming our responses to that of other individuals depends on their social proximity and perceived similarity (Cialdini, 2001; Lapinski and Rimal, 2005) . Consequently, it comes as no surprise to see that the perceived beliefs of family, friends and other people with whom individuals share a personal connection appear to be more closely linked to subjective interpretations of a seemingly ambiguous weather event than indications made by comparatively socially-distal political and media figures.
Most individuals (74.56%) in this analysis subjectively attributed the 2013/2014 UK flooding to climate change to a level at which a positive link was observed between flooding experience and perceived threat from climate change, as well as an indirect link between flooding experience and climate change mitigation responses. However, among a minority who did not perceive the flooding to be attributable to climate change, flooding experience had no significant link with perceived threat from climate change or climate change mitigation responses. The interpretation of extreme weather experiences among the public is highly subjective and variable because experience is socially constructed and the linkages between extreme weather events and climate change are often difficult to establish (Marlon et al., 2018) .
As indicated by Weber (2010) , personal experience alone is not a panacea and concern can only result from experiences of adverse impacts that are seen to be connected to the phenomenon whose perceived severity and likelihood is being studied. This means that local weather experiences are unlikely to inspire and sustain positive climate change engagement unless people clearly connect the dots between climate change and extreme weather impacts (Knowles, 2017; Palm et al., 2017) . Thus, the subjective attribution of extreme weather events and the shaping influence of the contexts in which subjective attribution occurs are as critical to driving public engagement with climate change, and as deserving of scholarly interest and investigation, as extreme weather experiences.
The interaction between flooding experience and attribution in this study suggests that, within a given population sample, the likelihood of observing a significant link between extreme weather experience and climate change attitudes may depend on the distribution of individual differences in the subjective attribution of the extreme weather event(s) to climate change; a factor which plausibly explains the mixed evidence previously observed for a link between flooding experiences and climate change attitudes in the UK. It also prompts consideration of how this distribution may be affected by limitations in popular approaches to assessing the effects of extreme weather experiences. Scholarly interest in the link between extreme weather experiences and climate change attitudes is premised on evidence of plausible connections between extreme weather and climate change, the probability that members of the public recognise these connections and a presumption that recognising these connections constitutes a compelling reason to act on climate change. Brushing over the heterogeneity of public opinion on the attributability of extreme weather to climate change in a bid to establish the third element of this premise raises the risk of producing results that spuriously support researchers' presuppositions.
For instance, many individuals were keen to state their belief that factors other than climate change contributed to the 2013/2014 UK winter flooding in open-ended comments collected in the current study. In line with prior research (Whitmarsh, 2008) , some of the most common factors mentioned were poor watercourse management and a lack of investment in flood defences. It has previously been observed that the relationship between personal experience and climate change perceptions is methodologically difficult to untangle (Demski et al., 2017) , and there remains a need to back up current evidence of the potential of extreme weather experiences to foster climate change engagement with robust approaches that allow for a richer representation of the subjective interpretation of extreme weather events among various publics. Further, while the core hypothesis of this article regarding the interaction between extreme weather experience and subjective attribution was supported in the context of flooding experience and perceived threat from climate change, the estimated effect of the interaction is modest. Therefore, replications of the current findings among other populations and in relation to experiences of other forms of extreme weather are needed to lend further credence to the arguments presented in this article.
Conclusion
The current findings support prior indications that the subjective attribution of extreme weather events to climate change moderates the translation of extreme weather experiences into climate change mitigation responses (Givens, 2014; McCright et al., 2014) . They also indicate that subjective attribution may be socially constructed on the bases of pre-existing climate change belief, political loyalties and perceived normative cues. Current developments in climate science portend increasingly robust assessments of the contribution made by climate change to specific weather events , and public engagement efforts could be significantly aided by placing scientific evidence of the connection between extreme weather and climate change, where available, at the fore of climate change communication (Messling et al., 2015) . However, substantive effort must also be directed at engaging the psychological and social contexts that shape individuals' willingness to recognize and act on this connection, with a view to enabling appropriate responding across the broad spectrum of society. Experienced disruption of essential services such as gas, electricity, water supply, drains, telephone or internet as a result of the floods .551
Other people in local area experienced damage to their property from the floods .633
Friends and family directly affected by floods .537 Subjective attribution (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree)
.81 1 factor extracted: Eigenvalue = 2.19; Variance explained = 72.95%
The floods were caused in part by climate change .745 The floods were a sign that the impacts of climate change are happening now .887
The floods showed us what we can expect from climate change in the future .686
Perceived threat
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Mitigation behavioural intentions
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